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As organizations increasingly deploy Inter-organizational Information Systems (IOS), the 
interdependent security risk they add is a problem affecting market efficiency. Connected 
organizations become part of entire networks, and are subject to threats from the entire network; 
but members’ security profile information is private, members lack incentives to minimize 
impact on peers and are not accountable. We model the problem as a signaling-screening game, 
and outline an incentive mechanism that addresses these problems. Our mechanism proposes 
formation of secure communities of organizations anchored by Security Compliance Consortium 
(SCC), with members held accountable to the community for security failures. We study the 
interconnection decisions with and without the mechanism, and characterize conditions where 
the mechanism plays roles of addressing moral hazard and hidden information issues by 
screening the organizations’ security types and/or by providing them incentives to improve. We 
also discuss the welfare gains and the broad impact of the mechanism. 
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Today’s competitive environment has significantly raised the stakes for modern organization, 
forcing them to explore new initiatives to improve their business efficiencies and reduce cost. To 
meet this particular need, the focus of information technology has shifted from the organizational 
level to the inter-organizational level. Hengst and Sol (2001) For example, Wal-Mart and Procter 
& Gamble have developed a channel partnership by leveraging their information technologies 
and sharing data across their mutual supply chains. The coordination of supply chain channel 
activities is significantly improved and the need for inventory is also reduced as a result. Grean 
and Shaw (2000) In addition, a rich set of literature (e.g. Ghattas and Soffer 2009; Soper et al. 
2007) has reported on the organizational activities of routinely using networks to interconnect 
and share information with their partners, suppliers and customers. Such interconnections serve a 
wide variety of purposes: communication, information sharing, electronic data interchange, 
transaction fulfillment, business process integration, outsourcing relationships, and formation of 
strategic alliances. Information systems are transitioning to an era of inter-organizational 
information systems (IOS). 
 
However, the above literature also points out that the further development of IOS faces many 
challenges, which may be related to strategy, management, policy and technology. Potential 
lock-in effects, network externalities, change management and organizational resistance, 
differing organizational cultures, variation in law and regulations across markets, differing 
business protocols and process definitions, data format incompatibility, consensus of choice and 
availability of appropriate technologies and variation in compliance requirements, are among a 
few on the list. Majority of the current research and industry efforts have focused on the above 
aspects (e.g. Fang et al. 2008; Soliman and Janz 2004). In this paper, we focus on a key 
challenge of IOS that has not received sufficient attention: security. 
 
When companies connect their Information Systems with one another, the security risk accrues 
not only due to potential vulnerabilities of their direct partners, but also due to the vulnerability 
of organizations that their partners in turn connect to. Inter-organizational link to a business 
partner can expose an organization to network-wide risks in multiple ways: a virus at a remote 
member of the business network may travel multiple trusted links to eventually harm the 
organization’s network; a hacker gaining access to a remote network can cascade intrusions 
through a sequence of links in the network and gain access to the organization; a zombie node in 
a remote organization can initiate denial-of-service attacks against the network; lack of 
compliance by employees in a remote organization can lead to security breaches of any of the 
above types; the organization may be indirectly reachable from another whose security policies 
fall below requirements. 
 
The risks described above are considered to be a type of security risks caused by interconnection. 
To describe the idea of risks caused by interconnection, one can think of the risks that a house is 
caught on fire. In a community when houses are closely located, the risk is higher even though 
the owners themselves protect their house very carefully, such as not leaving the house with the 
candles lit. However, the house can still be vulnerable if the neighbors were careless. The same 
idea applies when organizations interconnect their information systems to improve business 
efficiencies. Even though one organization has invested a significant amount of money in 
safeguarding their own information systems and training their own employees on security risks 
(such as ways to prevent social engineering), their transaction data could be available through 
their interconnected business partners (e.g. suppliers) who do not have a good security protection 
and are easier for hackers to find ways to break into their systems. 
 
Such interconnection risks significantly affect the organizations’ incentives to use IOS due to the 
inability to foresee the vulnerability of the overall interconnection (Kumar and Sareen 2009; 
Kunreuther and Heal 2003). To alleviate such concerns and provide better incentives for 
organizations to conduct business more efficiently, we propose an incentive mechanism 
anchored by a Security Compliance Consortium (SCC), leading to the formation of a secure 
community of organizations, each member of which is accountable to every other member for 
security related losses caused by it. 
 
Our proposed incentive mechanism tries to tackle the problem of self-interested organizations 
withholding private information (a.k.a. information asymmetry). For example, organizations may 
not have security infrastructure in place to protect themselves and their business partners. It 
could be an acceptable situation inside the organization due to the way their systems support 
their business. However, if such an organization creates an interconnected link with their 
business partners, their business partners will incur a much higher risk than expected. Our 
mechanism is designed to induce organizations to reveal their true types regarding their existing 
security profiles. Or, even better, it can provide such organizations incentives to improve the 
infrastructure and hence enhance their chance of establishing business connections. Revelation of 
types and improved investments in security by an individual organization would benefit the 
community as a whole. In other words, our proposed mechanism seeks to ensure that self-
interested actions aggregate to advancing the community welfare as well. 
 
The key to resolving the interdependency issue and meeting the above objective is 
accountability. Our proposed SCC will impose accountability among the participating 
organizations and force them to make their security and interconnection decisions considering 
not only themselves but the overall network as a whole. The secure community of organizations 
serves as the basis of a mechanism that reduces information asymmetry. The community is 
administered by a Security Compliance Consortium (SCC), and choice to join is voluntary, but 
comes with accountability for losses caused by the member organization to any other member of 
the community. The SCC administers membership in the community with the objective of 
ensuring outcomes that are best for the community. It may be constituted by consensus among a 
consortium of leading organizations. It is not required that the SCC takes specific stances on 
choice of technologies or specific standards of security within the community. SCC does not 
require member organizations to conform to a specified level of security, given the difficulty to 
observe and verify the security level or investment. 
 
To demonstrate the improvement in efficiency, we present an analytical model with two types 
(type 1 and type 2) of organizations, which are different in their costs of improving security from 
low to high probability of safety. A type 1 organization tends to maintain a high security level 
but a type 2 organization does not have an incentive to maintain a high security level due to 
various reasons. A type 2 organization finds it more expensive to improve its security level in 
order to ensure accountability to the whole community. Both types are self-interested in all 
actions, and their information about their types is private. Their investments in improving 
security are not publicly observable. 
 
The most obvious reason for an organization to be of type 2 is that the company’s security policy 
and practice may be too liberal. Organizations that consider security important may still find 
themselves in type 2 category for a variety of reasons. Some possible reasons are: lack of 
resources in small firms, lax employee practices, lack of central control, treating security as a 
necessary but not important requirement primarily for compliance, lack of attention due to a lack 
of any past history of attacks, and being located in a geographic area or internet domain which 
has low security profile. 
 
Organizations in our model have three choices: to join the community or not, the type of 
connection used (with or without IOS) to share information with each partner, and what type of 
safety level to maintain for their information systems. There is no value in not being connected. 
We model the interdependent choices of organizations as a signaling-screening game. 
 
When members of the community connect with others using IOS, they incur managed risk and 
gain value. The risk is managed because community membership implies accountability by 
partners. Connecting with other members without using IOS is a dominated strategy for the 
members. With non-members (outsiders), members of the community have two choices. The 
first is to connect using IOS, which implies higher security risk. The other option is to connect 
without IOS, implying no risk of interconnection, but less added value due to increased 
operational costs, delayed information acquisition, and/or sub-optimal decision making. 
 
When the partners are not members of the community, connection using IOS also incurs 
additional cost of securing the interconnection. Outsiders’ choices of mode of interconnection 
with other outsiders will also involve choosing whether to connect with IOS or not, with the 
former option adding risk, and the latter option reducing value. Outsiders’ interconnection with 
members will depend on the choices made by members. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing literature on 
organizational security risks and interorganizational systems. We then describe the analytical 
model, discuss its implications, characterize the effects of introduction of the mechanism under 
various conditions and demonstrate welfare gains in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper 




Information security has been a focus of Information Systems (IS) research long before security 
became a mainstream topic (e.g. Straub 1990; Straub et al. 2008). Many of the recent studies 
focus on the economic aspects of information system security (Gordon and Loeb 2006; Kannan 
and Telang 2005). Of particular interest is the question of how organizations decide to invest in 
security and at what levels. The investment question has been addressed in the general context 
(e.g., Gordon and Lobe 2002; Hausken 2006) and in the context of a specific class of security 
solutions, Intrusion Detection Systems (Cavusoglu et al. 2005). The common approach in 
investment research has been to treat security risks as exogenous, even when both external 
attacks and internal threats are investigated. In general, IS research has focused on information 
security in the context of intra-organizational information systems. We identify issues of 
interdependent risk originating from interconnections using IOS, and propose a solution to 
improve efficiency of investment in the presence of such risk. 
 
Literature on economic aspects and interdependent risks of IOS is limited. Prior research has 
examined IOS from the economic perspective in the context of their adoption, diffusion, property 
rights, network externalities and switching costs (e.g. Bakos and Nault 1997; Barua and Lee 
1997; Han et al. 2004; Wang and Seidmann 1995; Zhu et al. 2006). Kunreuther and Heal (2003) 
characterizes a class of interdependent security risks and demonstrate that firms generally under-
invest in security protections when their security risks are interdependent. Varian (2004) 
explained the decision on security investment in such a multi-firm environment using the theory 
of “private provisioning of public goods,” which was well-studied in economics (See Mas-Colell 
at al. 1995; Varian 1992; Samuelson 1954). This line of literature has been extended to a supply 
chain setting in Bandyopadhyay et al. (2010). Ogut et al. (2005) uses an economic model to 
examine firms’ investments in security protections and their use of cyber-insurance in the 
context of interdependent security risks. They find that security investment and the insurance 
coverage levels are less than the corresponding socially optimal levels when cyber-risks are 
interdependent. Zhao et al. (2009) considers both the positively and negatively interdependent 
security risks and examine two alternative risk management solutions—risk pooling arrangement 
(RPA) and managed security services (MSS) in addition to cyberinsurance. They find that RPA 
and MSS can complement cyberinsuance and help address the issues of investment inefficiency 
caused by risk interdependency. Interdependent risk of e-mail and Internet service providers has 
been examined in the context of spam, where mutual accountability among certified providers 
was found to reduce risk (e.g. Parameswaran et al. 2007; Zhao et al. 2008). Our paper 
complements this stream of research by studying solutions to inefficient investment in IOS 




In this section, we first introduce an analytical model to characterize decisions by organizations 
when acting alone. We then extend it to the case where information systems can be 
interconnected. We model the interconnection environment as a signaling-screening game, 
characterize various outcomes, and study welfare implications. 
 
In the absence of the mechanism, we show that moral hazard is prevalent, the low types have no 
incentive to improve security, and in some cases even the high types lack incentive to improve 
security. With the introduction of the mechanism, we show that the moral hazard problem can be 
addressed, high types always have an incentive to improve security, and the low types have an 
incentive to improve security under specific conditions. 
 
A security model for standalone information systems 
 
We assume a set of n modern organizations, each with its own information systems deployed 
within its organizational boundaries. The set of the organizations is denoted as 
N:={1,2,⋯,n}N:={1,2,⋯,n}. Each organization i ∈ N decides on the level of security investment 
based on a cost-benefit analysis. In order to do so, the organization needs to evaluate the 
following parameters: V i —the value of implementing the information systems in organization 
i; p i  ∈ (0, 1)—a probability measurement of the information systems safety level; v i —the 
expected loss of each security attack; and C i (p i )—the investment in security needed to 
maintain the security level p i . 
 
Note that prior literature has proposed many measurements of organizational information 
systems security. In this paper, we define the safety level as the probability that an organizational 
system stays risk free. In other words, (1 − p i ) represents the probability that the organizational 
IS will experience a security compromise. 
 
Without loss of generality, we assume that the safety level p i can be maintained at two possible 
values: p h and p l , where 0 < p l  < p h  < 1 . Organization i chooses between the two values and 
makes corresponding investment C i (p l ) or C i (p h ). It is also straightforward to assume that C 
i (p h ) > C i (p l ) because higher safety level is always harder to maintain. ΔC i is used to denote 
C i (p h ) − C i (p l ), “the cost of security improvement.” 
 
The choice is made by comparing the net value of information systems at the two specified 
security levels. Mathematically, the net value (denoted as UaloneiUialone) is computed as V i 
 − (1 − p i )v i  − C i (p i ), the value of using the system less the expected loss due to security risk 
and the cost of security investment. Lemma 11 shows that the organization’s choice of security 





Organization i will maintain a safety level pi  = ph if the cost of security improvement ΔCi is no 
higher than the expected reduction in loss from security failure (p h  − p i ) v i . The resulting net 
value of the information systems is: 
 
 




Please note that here we assume that the value V i is large enough so that  
 is at least positive. This condition ensures that all types of 
organizations will maintain a positive overall value, given their best choice of security, and stay 
in business. 
 
Prior to the advent of widespread use of IOS, each organization treated its own information 
systems as private assets managing their own information flows and improving efficiency of 
business processes. Investment in security was directed at proper functioning of systems and 
protecting the organizational information assets from being inappropriately accessed or 
modified. When organizational information systems stand alone, the organizations’ security 
investment choices are independent decisions that maximize their own net value. 
 
In this paper, we intend to assess levels and effectiveness of investments in security across all the 
organizations in the set. Therefore, we use overall welfare level, defined as the aggregate net 
value generated from the information systems for the n organizations, to measure the efficiency 
level of security investment. When organizations independently evaluate their system security 
environment and make corresponding decisions on their required safety level maximizing 
individual net value, the welfare level of the information systems across those organizations is 
maximized as well. However, as we will show in the following sections, inter-connecting the 
information systems across organizational boundaries will change the optimality of the welfare 
level when organizations make their security investment decisions in a decentralized fashion. 
 
Extending the security model to IOS 
 
Increasingly, organizations are realizing the value of information sharing and are deploying IOS. 
However, linking with information systems outside the organization brings additional security 
concerns to existing systems. Malicious hackers may find a way to route attacks to the targeted 
organization through the partner. Worse, the attack may not come from the business partners the 
organization directly linked to but from some organization that was linked with a business 
partner. All the organizations that are linked together directly or indirectly form an 
interconnected network, whose vulnerability accumulates all the organizations’ vulnerability. For 
example, if we denote the set of organizations in the same interconnected network with 
organization i as N i , then the aggregated probability of security breaches organization i expects 
to suffer will be   . In the equation, j is any organization that is directly or indirectly 
connected to organization i. Organization i’s expected loss in each attack is v i and hence the 
expected loss can be calculated as     For that reason, to evaluate the risk of 
interconnection, organization i needs to estimate all the other organizations’ safety level  for 
 . However,  is usually information private to organization j. No organization will 
voluntarily admit its safety level is low and push potential business partners away. This hidden 
information problem introduces a particular challenge for organizations in identifying secure 
business partners to interconnect with. 
 
For each organization, we assume that interconnecting its relevant information systems with 
those of their partners provides the most efficient business processes and competitive 
advantages. That is, if a pair of companies decide to form a strategic partnership and link their 
systems together using IOS, both of them will enjoy an added net value of VA, which can be 
considered the overall value less the investment and operating cost.2 Alternatively, if either 
decides that using IOS is not in its best interest, it can choose to perform the process that uses 
shared information asynchronously. For example, instead of allowing the salesperson from 
organization b to query its inventory level directly, organization a can request that the 
salesperson submit a request form and organization a will assign dedicated personnel to review 
the request and generate such an inventory report for organization b. Such an asynchronously 
processed procedure may delay information acquisition and lose critical decision time, 
sacrificing process efficiency. Therefore, we assume that the added value from a partnership 
without IOS can only partially realize all the potential benefits of an information system linkage, 
denoted as δVA . δ ∈ [0, 1) is a discount factor indicating the proportion of the value that can be 
realized from the asynchronously linked inter-organizational processes. 
 
In order to study the different connection decisions, we assume that there are two types of 
organizations, namely type 1 and type 2 organizations. Each incurs different costs in improving 
its safety level. That is, ΔCi takes two possible values: Δ1 and Δ2. Type 1(2) organizations incur 
cost Δ1 (Δ2) to improve their safety levels from p l to p h . Without loss of generality, we assume 
that Δ1 < Δ2. Each organization knows its own type, but it cannot identify whether other 
organizations are of type 1 or type 2. That is, both the cost of security improvement and the 
safety level of an organization are private information which is neither observable nor verifiable 
by outsiders of the organization. All organizations share the common belief that the total number 
of type 1 organizations is n 1 and the total number of type 2 organizations is n2 = n − n1. We also 
assume that vi  = v for all organizations and focus on heterogeneous cost of security investment 
only. 
 
An organization expects to establish partnerships with only a proportion of the other n − 1 
organizations. We use a parameter λ to denote this proportion. In order to avoid trivial cases and 




Condition 1 focuses on the case where type 2 organizations do not have incentive to improve 
their safety level from p l to p h if their systems are standalone. Condition 2 restricts that the cost 
of security improvement is not too high for type 1 organizations so that they may invest in high 
safety level p h if they were concerned about the overall risk that they may impose on other type 
1 organizations. Condition 3 requires that the added value of connecting with IOS to all the type 
1 organizations, , is lower than the overall added risks that all the type 1 
organizations may incur by connecting to each other but they all maintain low safety 
levels, n 1(n 1 − 1) (1 − p l )v. Note that the term (n 1 − 1) appear on both sides of condition 3 and 
were hence cancelled out. Therefore, it is more desirable to induce type 1 organizations to 
maintain a high security level from a welfare point of view. 
 
An organization needs to evaluate whether it is worthwhile to connect with its partner firms 
using IOS by trading off the added business value derived from the connection and the expected 
security risk that the connection entails. Let  denote the expected net value for company i 
to interconnect its information systems with its business partners’, which can be computed using 




When the value of λ is large, it indicates an abundance of business opportunities with 
partnerships, and it is very likely that an organization will connect with all other organizations 
using IOS. Organization i will have to evaluate the risk using the worst case scenario where N I 
converges to the whole set N. Comparing the value of , the company gains added 
value λ(n − 1)V A from interconnection, but expects to suffer losses due to 
compromises originating from other organizations. Alternatively, organization i can decide to 





Type 2 organizations choose to maintain a low safety level pl no matter whether they decide to 
connect with or without IOS. Type 1 organizations will maintain a low safety level p l if Δ1 > (p h 
 − p l )v, otherwise, they will improve their safety levels to ph . 
 
Lemma 2 shows that when an organization decides to connect using IOS, it only considers its 
own cost of investment in security and the losses the externally sourced security risk may cause 
at its own systems. Other organizations’ inter-connection decisions or security investment 
decisions will not affect its security investment decision. Therefore, the decisions about security 
investment levels are made in a decentralized fashion. Then, in order to decide whether to 
connect its system to the systems of other organizations, organization i will need to estimate the 
overall network security status and the expected risk based on other organizations’ investment 




Proposition 1 provides the threshold conditions on when an organization will adopt connecting 
with IOS strategies compared to connecting without IOS strategies. It is worth noting that in our 
assumption, the value of connection is always positive so that an organization is always better off 
when connecting without IOS than not connecting at all. Combining with the security level 
decisions, we are able to identify four possible scenarios, as shown in Fig. 1a–d. Table 1 
summarizes the firms’ connection decisions. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Four outcomes without incentive mechanism 
 
 
Table 1 Summary of outcomes without SCC mechanism 
 
In Fig. 1a and b (corresponding to Proposition 1(1), type 1 organizations will invest in a high 
safety level and type 2 organization will invest in a low safety level, due to the cost of improving 
security is too high for type 2. However, in Fig. 1a, all the organizations will connect with each 
other with IOS, regardless of their safety levels, because the high benefit of connecting 
overcomes the expected loss. In Fig. 1b, the organizations will interconnect without IOS, due to 
the fact that the added value is not worth the cost of increased security vulnerability. 
 
In Fig. 1c and d (corresponding to Proposition 1(2), both type 1 and type 2 organizations will 
invest in a low security level because the cost of improving security is too high for both types. 
However, in Fig. 1c, all the organizations will still connect with each other with IOS even though 
none of the organizations has a satisfactory safety level. This case can only occur when the 
added benefit of connecting is really high and the expected security loss is relatively affordable. 
In Fig. 1d, the organizations will interconnect without IOS, due to the fact that none of the 
organizations has provided a satisfactory security protection and hence the security risk of 
interconnection becomes really severe. This scenario is the worst situation that can occur since 
none of the organizations is well protected and neither can they do business efficiently with IOS 
due to their security concerns. 
 
In Section 3.4, we are able to calculate the welfare level in each scenario and compare the 
welfare improvement when our proposed mechanism is in place. 
 
Implementation of mechanism with SCC 
 
In this section, we consider the case where each organization has the choice of whether to 
participate in SCC and comply with the accountability constraints. 
 
The implementation of SCC works as follows. The SCC certifies all the organizations that decide 
to join the consortium. All the network traffics and activities send among the SCC organizations 
will be monitored. The certification technologies must be used to guarantee authentication and 
non-repudiation. That is, SCC organizations are confident of identifying the source of the 
security attacks due to authentication technologies. A SCC organization cannot deny the security 
attacks that originated from its network. Meanwhile, it cannot claim that it has suffered security 
attacks originated from other SCC organizations when it does not have. Candidate technologies 
which fulfill these characteristics of certification are Public/Private Key Infrastructure, such as 
digital signatures. 
 
The implementation of the SCC mechanism may generate extra overhead to identify the 
organizations’ certification status. We ignored such an impact in our model by assuming that the 
size of overhead is negligible compared to the regular traffic. In situations that the assumption 
does not hold, we suggest that the SCC adjust the subscription fee to accommodate the overhead 
cost. Although the overhead will create a deadweight loss which reduces the value of the SCC 
mechanism, the loss is inevitable as no security mechanism is free. Given the rising concerns on 
interdependent security risks, the overhead should not diminish the incentive of organizations 
adopting the SCC mechanism. 
 
Since we assume that organizations will enjoy the benefit of added business efficiency if they 
connect with IOS, they will always want to do so if there is enough security protection. By 
joining the community, the organization assumes responsibility for maintaining the security of 
the overall community. Specifically, if an organization connects with other organizations using 
IOS, it is responsible for all the losses due to security failures routing via its own systems. 
Meanwhile, it collects compensation if it suffers from security failure originating from other 
participating organizations. As a result, the overall protection towards the interdependent risks 
inside the SCC is always better than that outside of the SCC. This fact provides organizations 
willing to connect with IOS an added incentive to join the SCC. However, if an organization 
decides not to connect with SCC, then it really does not have any incentive to join SCC since it 
cannot hold other organizations responsible when security attacks occur, which must be from 
their own network. So we ignore the possibility that an organization joins the SCC but decides 
not to connect with IOS. 
 
After deciding to join the community, each organization then decides on its safety level and 
strategies for connecting with other members of SCC or non-members. Define Nin as the set of 




If organization i has already participated in SCC, it will maintain a high safety level if 
 
 
Comparing the result of Lemma 3 to Lemma 1, we observe a higher threshold of security 
improvement cost for organizations to stay in low safety level. Therefore, the organizations are 
more likely to improve their safety levels when the mechanism is in place. Without the 
mechanism, an organization is only concerned about its own loss due to security attacks, which 
is (p h  − p l )v . If its cost of security improvement is higher than that level, it decides to stay at a 
low safety level even when such a decision may cause more damage to the other interconnected 
organizations. When it decides to participate in SCC, it will evaluate not only its own security 
loss but also the expected compensation that it has to make to other organizations due to its 
poorly maintained safety level. Therefore, it will increase its security level to high when the cost 
to do so is lower than the overall expected compensation paid towards the participating 
organizations, . We can hence claim that our mechanism provides stronger 
incentives for security improvement. 
 
Each organization, in order to decide whether to participate in SCC, needs to evaluate how many 
other organizations will participate and what their connection and security decisions are. Such a 
signaling-screening game may lead to multiple equilibria and requires the SCC to coordinate so 
as to obtain the most efficient equilibrium outcome. In this paper, we focus on examining two 
major types of equilibria: a pooling equilibrium where all the organizations participate in SCC 
and a separating outcome where only type 1 organizations participate. Each equilibrium may 
require different existing conditions. In the following sections, we will derive these conditions 
and analyze the organizations’ corresponding safety levels and connecting decisions. 
 
Pooling outcome: Both types participate 
 
When both types participate, the size of the overall community is n and N in = N. Use super-script 
“comm-p” to denote the case when a pooling outcome is obtained and the organizations join the 




According to Lemma 3 and Condition 2, we can conclude that type 1 organizations will always 
maintain a high safety level if they join the community. Type 2 organizations may maintain a 
high safety level if Δ2 ≤ n(1 − p l )v. Otherwise, they will maintain a low safety level. Figure 2a 
and b summarize the two pooling outcomes. Figure 2a describes the scenario that all the 
organizations join SCC and maintain a high security level. Figure 2b shows the case when they 
all join SCC but only type 1 organizations maintain a high security level and type 2s do not. The 
following Proposition 2 shows the condition when each of the the pooling outcomes may hold. 
 
 




When Δ2 ≤ n (p h  −  p l )v  −  (n − 1) · max { 0, (1−pl)v−λ(1−δ)VA}(1−pl)v−λ(1−δ)VA} , both 
types of organizations will participate in the SCC community and choose to implement the high 
safety level. When λ(1−δ)VA≥(1−pl)vλ(1−δ)VA≥(1−pl)v and Δ2 > n(p h  − p l ) v, both types of 
organizations will participate in the SCC community, but type 2 organizations will decide to 
maintain the low safety level. Under other conditions, the pooling outcomes cannot be supported 
since type 2 organizations will find it better to stay outside of SCC. 
 
The result of Proposition 2 provides insight on when each type will participate in SCC. Table 2 
summarizes the firms’ connection and investment decisions in presence of SCC. 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of the outcomes with the SCC mechanism 
 
Generally speaking, type 2 organizations are more reluctant to improve their safety levels due to 
the higher security costs they incur. In order to keep them in the SCC community and to hold 
them accountable for security loss caused by them, one of the two conditions need to hold: (a) 
the cost of security level must be lower than a specific threshold so that they will improve their 
safety levels to p h in order to reduce the expected compensation payout; or, (b) the added value 
of connection with IOS compared to connection without IOS, λ(1 − δ) V A must be high enough 
so that they would find it worth staying inside connected network and compensating their 
partners for the losses caused by their low safety levels. 
 
Separating outcome: Only type 1 organizations participate 
 
When the conditions to support pooling outcomes described in above Proposition 2 do not hold, 
type 2 organizations may start to leave the community because it is too costly for them to 
maintain high safety level (i.e. Δ2 is too high) and the accountability has imposed too high a 
burden if they decide to just stay at the low safety level. In such a case, a type 2 organization 
may not be considered as a good candidate for type 1 organizations to deploy IOS with. If that is 
true, the SCC will attempt to maintain a smaller interconnected network with only type 1 
organizations. In this case, the total number staying in the SCC community is n 1. 
 
When type 2 organizations decide to stay outside of the SCC community, type 1 organizations 
need to decide whether maintaining IOS connections with them is valuable. If a type 1 
organization decides to maintain such a connection, the type 2 organizations’ low safety levels 
may cause trouble to not only its own systems but also to all the other systems in the SCC 
network, which the type 1 organization will be held accountable for. 
 
Lemma 4  
 
A type 1 organization, if it decides to stay in SCC community comprised of all other type 1 
organizations, will maintain a high safety level, and choose to connect with type 2 organizations 
without IOS. 
 
Type 2 organizations, if they decide to stay outside of the community, will be “cut off” from type 
1 organizations as stated in Lemma 4. They can also have a choice in whether to connect using 
IOS with other type 2 organizations. However, they also do not have an incentive to do so in this 
case since they will also be concerned about the security risk brought by the other type 2 




In the separating outcome, a type 2 organization will maintain a low safety level, and choose not 
to connect with other type 2 organizations with IOS. 
 
Together, Lemmas 4 and 5 describe the only possible separating outcome where only type 1 
organizations will join SCC and maintain high security level. Type 2 organizations will stay 
outside SCC, connected to each other without IOS, and invest in low security levels. Figure 2c 








When the separating equilibrium holds, the type 1 organizations together form an interconnected 
network among them. Within the interconnected network, they enjoy efficient connections with 
IOS and the full added value of such connection. Their security risk is limited since all will 
maintain high safety level. The non-members will stay outside such a community and connect 
with either members or other non-members without using IOS. They choose to do so because 
they do not want to join the network by maintaining high safety levels or by compensating the 
members once their systems are compromised and in turn affect other members. Meanwhile, 
they will not connect their IOS with other non-members since they know those other non-
members are also maintaining low safety levels and connecting with them will introduce too 
many security problems to their own systems. The separating equilibrium holds when the value 
of connecting λ(1 − δ)V A is neither too high to attract type 2 organizations into the community 
nor too low to become unattractive to other type 1 organizations. In addition, the cost of security 
improvement for type 2 must be high enough such that they would not want to improve and the 
cost improvement for type 1 must be low enough such that they have incentive to improve their 
safety levels and stay in the network. 
 
Outcomes and Efficiency Comparison 
 
Now we have introduced all the seven outcomes, including four outcomes when there is no 
incentive mechanism and three outcomes when the mechanism is introduced. We next compare 
the outcomes with SCC and without SCC and evaluate the efficiency change. The analysis helps 
examine the value of our mechanism as an incentive mechanism (to improve security) or as a 
signaling tool or as both. We can also identify when and why our mechanism generates higher 
welfare levels. 
 
Comparing the conditions that support each outcome, we identified nine scenarios with different 
possible changes of outcomes from the network without mechanism to the network with 
mechanism. In each of them, our mechanism may play a different role. We discuss those nine 
possible changes one by one, by first introducing the conditions and then discussing the changes 
in decisions by both types of organizations. We will also quantify the welfare improvement for 
each case. Table 3 summarizes the following scenarios in terms of the conditions they hold, and 
the change of cases when there is no SCC to when SCC is implemented. 
 
 
Table 3 Summary of the changes from no SCC to SCC 
 
Scenario 1   When λ(1 − δ) V A  ≥ E(1 − p)v,3 Δ1 ≤ (p h  − p l )v, and Δ2 ≤ n (p h  − p l )v  −  (n − 1) · 
max { 0,(1 − p l )v − λ(1 − δ) V 
A }: 
 
Without the mechanism: these conditions will lead type 1 organizations to choosing a 
high safety level but type 2 to choosing a low safety level. Since organizations cannot 
identify which of the others are of type 1, they have to make their connection decisions 
based on the expected safety level. When λ(1 − δ)V A  ≥ E(1 − p)v, they connect to all 
other organizations using IOS even knowing some have a low safety level. (The outcome 
is described in Fig. 1a) 
With the SCC mechanism: type 2 will find it worthwhile to improve its safety level and 
participate in the SCC. This is because the mechanism does not allow them to “free ride” 
the type 1 organizations. They need to be accountable for their own losses. In fact, type 2 
also benefit from this outcome since the SCC provides a safe environment to them as 
well. (The outcome is described in Fig. 2a) 
Improvement of welfare = n 2 n (p h  − p l ) v − n 2 Δ2, which is composed of the total 
reduced security loss of the network less the total cost for type 2 organizations to improve 
security. The improvement is strictly positive. 
 
Scenario 2   When λ(1−δ)VA≥(1−pl)vλ(1−δ)VA≥(1−pl)v, and Δ1 ≤ (p h  − p l )v: 
 
Without the mechanism: same outcome as described in the first case. (Fig. 1a) 
 
With the SCC mechanism: type 2 still finds improving its safety level is too costly and 
hence stays at a low safety level. However, since the value of connecting with IOS is 
high, they will still join the SCC community. (Fig. 2b) 
 
Improvement of welfare = 0. There is no change in connection and security decisions for 
both types of organizations. This is because the decisions are already efficient under the 
parameters. However, one notable issue without the mechanism was that type 1 will 
suffer from the low safety level maintained by type 2 organizations. With the SCC in 
place, type 2 will compensate type 1’s losses for connecting with them. Such a re-
allocation of net values introduces fairness as type 2 organizations take responsibility for 
the losses caused by their own decisions to stay at a low safety level. 
 
Scenario 3   When λ(1−δ)VA∈[E(1−p)v,(1−pl)v), Δ1 ≤ (p h  − p l )v, and Δ2>(ph−pl)v+(n−1)[λ(1− 
δ)VA−(1−ph)v]: 
 
Without the mechanism: same outcome as described in the first case. (Fig. 1a) 
 
With the SCC mechanism: type 2 still finds improving its safety level costly and hence 
stays at a low safety level. In addition, since the value of connecting with other 
organizations with IOS is lower than the above case 2, type 2 organizations will also find 
that it is not worth paying the compensation and staying in the SCC community. 
Therefore, they will stay out. Meanwhile, type 1 will stay in the SCC community, invest 
in a high safety level, and connect with other type 1 organizations with IOS, connect with 
those non-members (i.e.type 2 organizations) without IOS (Fig. 2c) 
 
Improvement of welfare = n2[n1(1−ph)+(n−1)(1−pl)]v−n2(n1+n−1)⋅λ(1−δ)VA. The first 
term is the expected reduction of security loss and the second term is the loss due to 
disconnecting the type 2 organizations from the IOS. The change of welfare will be 
positive if the number of type 1 organizations (i.e. the size of SCC community) is large 
enough:  .The value of the SCC under this condition is to help 
separate the low safety ones to ensure secure connections (avoid unsafe connections). 
 
Scenario 4   When λ(1−δ)VA∈[(1−ph)v,E(1−p)v), Δ1 ≤ (p h  − p l )v, and Δ2≤(ph−pl)v+(n−1)[λ(1− 
δ)VA−(1−ph)v]: 
  
Without the mechanism: type 1 organizations will choose a high safety level but type 2 
will choose low. Since the organizations cannot identify which of the others are of type 1, 
they make connection decisions based on the expected safety levels and now they decide 
not to connect with IOS since the expected value of connecting is too low to cover the 
security loss. (Fig. 1b) 
 
With the SCC mechanism: type 2s will find it worthwhile to improve their safety levels 
and participate in the SCC so the expected network risk is lower and both types will 
participate in the SCC community. (Fig. 2a) 
 
 
Improvement of welfare =n(n−1)[λ(1−δ)VA−(1−ph)v]+n2[(ph−pl)v−Δ2]. The first term 
represents the total improved net value of more efficient connections less the added risks 
when they are interconnected. The second term is for type 2 organizations to improve 
their safety levels. Our mechanism, under this condition, efficiently provides type 2 
organizations with incentives to improve security, alleviates the security concerns, and 
induces efficient connections. 
 




Without the mechanism: this case is the same as the above case 4, where the network is 
not connected using IOS. (Fig. 1b) 
 
With the SCC mechanism: type 2 will stay outside due to their high cost of security 
improvement. Type 1 is then able to identify the other high type partners and form more 
efficient connections with them. (See Fig. 2c) 
 
Improvement of welfare =n1(n1−1)[λ(1−δ)V
A−(1−ph)v](1−ph)v], representing the 
improved connections among the n 1 type 1 organizations. 
 
Scenario 6   When λ(1−δ)VA≥(1−pl)v, Δ1 > (p h  − p l )v, and Δ2 ≤ n (p h  − p l )v: 
 
Without the mechanism: both types will choose a low safety level due to their cost 
concerns. However, they are still connected via IOS since the value of connection is high. 
This is the case where organizations expect the largest security loss from the network. 
(See Fig. 1c) 
 
With the SCC mechanism: both types find it worthwhile to improve their safety levels to 
high and participate in the SCC. The mechanism provides incentive for both to improve 
security. (The outcome is described in Fig. 2a) 
 
Improvement of welfare  =n2(ph−pl)v−n1Δ1- n 2 Δ2,} which is composed of the total 
reduced security loss less the costs for both types of organizations. 
 
Scenario 7   When λ(1−δ)VA≥(1−pl)v, Δ1 > (p h  − p l )v, and Δ2 > n (p h  − p l )v  −  (n − 1) · max 
{0, (1 − p l )v − λ(1 − δ) V 
A }: 
 
 Without the mechanism: same outcome as described in the first case. (Fig. 1c) 
 
With the SCC mechanism: type 1 organizations find it worthwhile to improve their safety 
level to high and participate in the SCC while type 2 will also participate but remain at 
low safety levels due to their high costs of improving security. The mechanism provides 
incentives only for type 1 to improve security. (Fig. 2b) 
 
Improvement of welfare  =n1[n(ph−pl)v−Δ1]=n1[n(ph−pl)v−Δ1] , representing the 
improved security of type 1 organizations. 
 
Scenario 8   When λ(1−δ)VA∈[(1−ph)v,(1−pl)v), Δ1 > (p h  − p l )v, and Δ2≤(ph−pl)v+(n−1)[λ(1− 
δ)VA−(1−ph)v]: 
Without the mechanism: both types will choose a low safety level due to their cost 
concerns. In addition, they will not connect their IOS since the value gained is not worth 
the expected loss of security. (Fig. 1d) 
 
With the SCC mechanism: both types find it worthwhile to improve their safety levels to 
high and participate in the SCC (Fig. 2a) 
 
Improvement of welfare  =n(n−1)[λ(1−δ)VA−(1−pl)v]+n
2(ph−pl)v−n1Δ1−n2Δ2, since both 
types have improved their security and connection decisions. 
 
Scenario 9 




Without the mechanism: both types will choose low safety levels due to their cost 
concerns. In addition, they will not connect their IOS since the value gained is not worth 
the expected loss of security. (Fig. 1d) 
 
With the SCC mechanism: type 1 will participate and invest in improving safety level but 
type 2 will not. (Fig. 2c) 
 
Improvement of welfare  =n1(n1−1)[λ(1−δ)V
A−(1−ph)v]+n1[(ph−pl)v−Δ1], representing 





Organizations are increasingly using IOS to realize increased value from more efficient 
collaborations. For example, personnel from one organization can have access to the information 
systems of a business partner to query its inventory level or transaction history. Sales executives 
from one organization can query its business partner’s customer information via their CRM data 
portal. Linking information systems across organizational boundaries has enabled efficient 
business process integration, such as in supply chain management in vertical industries, B2B 
transactions, outsourcing relationships, and in strategic alliances. 
 
As the importance of fostering business eco-systems is increasingly recognized, information 
system interconnections are identified as the substrate to build such systems on. In particular, 
many such eco-systems rely on the network effects generated by linking information systems 
based on a common platform, to compete against other networks. The advent of new paradigms 
in information systems such as web services, software-as-service (SaaS) models, service oriented 
architectures (SOA), loosely coupled systems and cloud computing all lead to the spread of 
information systems outside organizational boundaries, where they link with other information 
systems. Trends toward modular, interoperable architectures and increasing use of the Internet 
and web as the channel and interface for linking information systems promote the extent of 
interconnections. An abundance of bandwidth and increase in the potential channels that provide 
connectivity accelerate these trends. The increasingly global nature of business necessitates more 
use of IOS as well. 
 
Use of IOS aggravates the security problems faced by organizations, which traditionally focus on 
protecting their systems from external intrusions and compromise of confidential information. 
With IOS, they are faced with security threats across an entire network of organizations they may 
be directly or indirectly connected to. The IOS network is affected by problems of lack of 
accountability by individual members toward other members, lack of incentives to invest in 
minimizing damage to other members, related moral hazard problems, hidden information about 
the security profile of peer organizations in the network and all of these lead to market 
inefficiencies in IOS investments. We have outlined an incentive mechanism that forms a 
community of organizations anchored by an SCC that emphasizes member accountability to the 
community to address these problems. We have demonstrated how the mechanism can address 
moral hazard, provide accountability, and furnish incentives under specified conditions. The 
introduction of the mechanism under various specified conditions was shown to lead to welfare 
gains. The mechanism can help separate the organizations with inferior security profile under 
certain conditions. 
 
The proposed mechanism will primarily reduce the complexity of the interconnection decision. 
This is accomplished by giving better information about the potential partner, and the 
corresponding risk. The mechanism expands focus of corporate security efforts from internal 
protection to cover impact on external partners as well. The concept of inter-organizational 
accountability is new and can have far reaching impact on security in particular and 
collaborations in general. The tradeoff between benefits of collaboration with community 
members and the potential cost from accountability will motivate organizations that seek to join 
to make optimal investments in security so as to minimize accountability effects. Thus the 
mechanism creates a powerful incentive for organizations to tie together technologies, policies 
and standards towards the combined objectives of protecting internal assets and minimizing 
negative impact on outside partners. Investments in security are expected to improve in 
efficiency as a result. 
 
As a community of organizations grows in size, it can develop network effects which will 
increase incentives for non-members to join the community and consequently, to secure their 
networks and connections as a precursor to joining the community. Those that have inherently 
low security levels, smaller organizations, and organizations that may gain minimal value from 
inter-organizational links may stay out. As the groups of members and non-members consolidate, 
the membership status will be more valuable in signaling information about the organizations. 
 
Information security contributes to operational risk incurred by an organization. Engaging in use 
of IOS introduces interdependency, and compounds this risk. In this paper, we have outlined a 
calculus to study interdependent operational risk. On a broader level, the mechanism forms the 
basis for managing interdependent risk under a general class of collaborations. It can be 
applicable to other domains characterized by interdependence, such as financial networks and 
supply chains. 
 
The mechanism can act as an encompassing framework for collaborations across national 
boundaries or across multiple standards where the simple focus on community membership and 
accountability can hide details of dealing with the disparity in laws or compliance requirements. 
 
The mechanism we propose does not seek to impose any technological constraints. Rather, it 
outlines the incentive framework at a broad level, allowing each organization to make its own 
choices of technologies, standards and policies to ensure meeting with the accountability 
requirements of the mechanism. This facilitates sustainability of the mechanism as technologies 
and threats change. A main source of security risk that organizations guard against today is the 
Internet. Organizations in our model will face the risk of exposure to the Internet. While it is not 
explicitly stated, the model does account for exposure to the Internet, in holding members 
accountable for any security related loss, regardless of the manner of origin. That implies 
member organizations have to secure their systems from Internet based risk, as well as ensure 
that they do not propagate Internet based malware to peer members. 
 
Some small organizations may rely on Internet Service Providers(ISP) and outsourcing to 
support their systems and connectivity. This may exclude them from the scope of the stated 
model. (Such small businesses may be ruled out by inability to bear the burden of accountability 
as well.) The community model can be expanded to cover ISPs where we expand the notion of 
organizations to that of an Administrative Domain, and use domain names to represent individual 
entities. Each domain that is a member of the community is accountable to the entire community 
for losses caused by it; which in turn can motivate individual domains to secure its outgoing 
information flows. In such a scenario, small businesses may add another criterion to decide 
which ISP to get service from: checking community membership status. 
 
In future research, the model may be applied to other forms of interdependent risk using the 
same calculus. The notion of an SCC may be extended to allow for the possibility of multiple 
communities, for example, one community supported by each industry consortium where IOS is 
important. It is also of interest to study communities competing against each other within the 
same industry. Formation of communities can lead to network effects, which are not modeled in 
this paper. The impact of network effects on evolution and competition of communities can be an 
interesting topic. The model can be extended to address changes in membership status across 
periods. The size of communities can have significant impact on membership decisions, and 
experimental investigations can study the formation and evolution of communities with a view to 
studying threshold and optimal sizes for communities. The role of the SCC may be compared in 





1. All the proofs of the Lemmas and Propositions are provided in Appendix A 
2. Please note here we do not single out each itemized benefit and cost. Rather, we keep the 
term in general. Our focus of this paper is on the benefit and cost from a security breach 
perspective. Therefore, we consider V A as the net value when there is no security issue 
at all. When there is potential security concern, we need to discount the value by 
including the cost of security investment and expected loss of security breach. 
3. Here, we define E(1 − p)v as the expected loss when the type p is not know. Therefore, 
E(1 − p) = [n 1 (1 − p h ) + n 2 (1 − p l )]/n. 
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